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 525 
MEDIATION IN MEDICAL TREATMENT: A MORE 
EFFECTIVE WAY TO MANAGE DISPUTES 
Caitlin McClay 
The right for competent persons to refuse medical treatment is based on their 
due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.1  
However, this right is not absolute.2  A person’s liberty interest must be balanced 
against state interests.3  Further, incompetent patients are unable to consent to 
medical treatment.4  In a process called “substituted judgement,” guardians or 
legally authorized persons are required to consent to treatment on behalf of the 
incompetent person.5  Incompetent patients may either be minors or adults who 
legally cannot make decisions for themselves.  Those under the age of eighteen 
are presumed automatically to lack “maturity, experience, and capacity for 
judgement required for making life’s difficult decisions.”6  Adults are 
incompetent when they “lack[] capacity to understand and weigh the available 
options regarding critical medical decisions.”7  Further, “the level of mental 
incapacity needed to be deemed incompetent depends on the nature of the 
medical decision at hand.”8  When there is disagreement amongst guardians and 
physicians over the incompetent patient’s proper medical treatment, the parties 
often turn to the court system for answers. 
The adversarial nature of court proceedings is an inefficient and often 
ineffective way to resolve disputes.  Court proceedings apply legal principles 
                                                 
 J.D., The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law, 2019; B.A. Christopher 
Newport University, 2016.  The author would like to thank Professor Lucia Silecchia for her 
invaluable guidance, and the Catholic University Law Review for its support in the publication 
process. 
 1. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990). 
 2. Id. at 279. 
 3. Id. 
 4. John Alan Cohan, Judicial Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Patients, 
39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 904 (2006). 
 5. Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward a 
Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without Advance 
Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1193, 1201–02 (1996).  
 6. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 620 (1979) (holding that the Georgia statutory 
procedures for admitting juveniles to mental health care facilities did not violate the minor’s due 
process rights). 
 7. Cantor, supra note 5, at 1201. 
 8. Id. at 1201 n.23.  The standard of mental capacity required to make life and death 
decisions will be higher than the capacity standard required for patients to make more minor 
decisions.  It is a sliding scale and the analysis is made according to the facts on a case by case 
basis, so there is some variance in results.  Id. 
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that fail to understand the deep layers of emotion underlying medical decision-
making.9  Advanced directives are often encouraged by hospitals, but the 
documents are often not an accurate reflection of what the patient wants.10  The 
court is no better situated to make medical treatment decisions than the patient 
and those closest to them. 
In these situations, conflict often centers on a failure of communication 
between patient, patient representatives, and doctors and therefore, a lack of 
information.11  A better solution to these problems is mediation.  Bioethical 
mediation that bridges the gap amongst the parties is “(1) less destructive to the 
disputants’ relationships; (2) more sensitive to the contextual features of 
disputes; (3) more consistent with the principle of patient self-determination; 
and (4) less publicly intrusive.”12 
Bioethical mediators, employed by the courts, with training in palliative care 
are the solution to resolving the dispute.  Mediation is not a viable solution in 
every case.  There are instances where improved communication will not help 
parties reach a decision.  However, even in these instances, mediation guarantees 
the parties have discerned the issue before resorting to a judge.  This creates a 
more efficient judicial process because the parties have a clear understanding of 
the situation prior to court proceedings.  
Part I of this Comment will examine four different scenarios in which courts 
order medical treatment.  The different scenarios include minor children, 
competent adults, pregnant women, and incompetent adults.  Minor children are 
considered incompetent to make medical decisions, so their parents or the state 
must consent to treatment on their behalf.13  However, some courts have applied 
the mature minor doctrine to allow minors to make their own medical decisions.  
                                                 
 9. Alisa L. Geller, In the Aftermath of the Terri Schiavo Case: Resolving End-of-Life 
Disputes Through Alternative Dispute Resolution, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 63, 66 (2006). 
 10. Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaption of Miranda to Advanced Directives: A Critique 
of the Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 140, 156 
(1999) (explaining that the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) requires federally funded 
hospitals to provide patients with information about advanced directives and laws and policies that 
govern advanced directives.  In addition to informing patients of their right to create an advanced 
directive, the PSDA also requires hospitals to honor the advanced directives).  It is important to 
note that the PSDA has no requirements about the contents or quality of the advanced directives.  
This is a major criticism of the law because it can force hospitals to use poorly thought out or 
written documents that have life and death consequences.  Id. at 140–41. 
 11. Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse 
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007). 
 12. Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-Life 
Treatment Disputes to Prevent Erosion of Physician-Patient Relationships, 79 B.U.L. REV. 1091, 
1097 (1999). 
 13. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Elizabeth J. Sher, Choosing for Children: 
Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 170 
(1983). 
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Competent adults do have the right to refuse medical treatment.14  The right to 
refusal will be weighed against state interests on a case by case basis to 
determine whether the courts can compel medical treatment.15  Pregnant women 
are a subcategory of competent adults in a unique position.16  Courts consider 
the competent adult’s right to refuse medical treatment balanced against state’s 
interests, which in these cases include the interests of the unborn child.17  Lastly, 
this part of the Comment examines how medical decisions are made in the case 
of incompetent adults. 
Part II examines the current methods the legal system uses to solve disputes.  
First, the use of court orders to compel patients to undergo a particular treatment 
or to prevent patients from undergoing a certain medical treatment is examined.  
Second, the doctrine of substitute judgement as a method of decision-making is 
examined.  Next, the Comment discusses the use of advanced directives to keep 
medical decisions out of courts and in the hands of the person undergoing 
treatment.  Finally, Part II examines the current models of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) in place to make medical decisions, specifically reviewing the 
use of medical futility statutes in hospital mediation. 
Part III proposes a model of ADR that can be used to aid in medical decision-
making.  First, Part III addresses which cases are best suited for mediation and 
which cases are not.  Then discussed is the necessary features of an ADR model 
mediating medical treatment cases and how the ADR model should be 
implemented.  Lastly, the benefits and drawbacks of using this ADR model to 
make medical decisions is explained. 
I. TYPES OF CASES IN WHICH COURTS ORDER MEDICAL TREATMENT 
A. Minor Children 
The Supreme Court stated, “[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are 
not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their 
need for medical care or treatment.  Parents can and must make those 
judgments.”18  However, when parents are unable or fail to make such decisions,                                                  
 14. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–79 (1990). 
 15. Superintendent of Belchertown St. Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424–25 (Mass. 
1977). 
 16. See Cohan, supra note 4, at 896–97 (discussing the extensive debate on the rights of 
women versus the rights of fetuses). 
 17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
 18. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.  Except in emergency cases, doctors must obtain consent from 
the minor’s parents in order to perform medical treatment.  Jonathan F. Will, My God My Choice: 
The Mature Minor Doctrine and Adolescent Refusal of Life-Saving or Sustaining Medical 
Treatment Based Upon Religious Beliefs, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 245 (2006).  
This policy behind this law “rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in 
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.  More 
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the 
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courts will intercede in the private interests of the family when the health and 
well-being of a minor is involved.19  The Supreme Court said in Stanley v. 
Illinois, that the state may only intervene when there is a “powerful 
countervailing interest” to protect.20 
Especially in the case of minors, it is important to recognize the difference 
between “medical treatment . . . important to the child’s well-being” and life-
sustaining medical treatment.21  Courts usually will not interfere with decisions 
to decline life-sustaining treatment “when there is uncontroverted medical 
evidence that a child is terminally ill or is in an irreversible and persistent 
vegetative state.”22  In these cases the state’s interest in protecting the child’s 
well-being is ensuring that the child suffers as little as possible, which is already 
being accomplished by the parents and the physicians. 
Courts will, however, intervene when parents refuse “medical treatment . . . 
important to the child’s well being . . . particularly if the treatment is necessary 
to save the child’s life.”23  When parents withhold consent to certain medical 
treatments for their children, they usually do so on religious grounds.24  In these 
cases, the Supreme Court has stated that the child’s welfare interest outweighs 
the religious liberty interests of the parents and their right to raise children the 
way they choose.25  Most often, the state advocates for the conventional medical 
approach, while parents advocate for “an alternative treatment that can range 
from taking no action to using different forms of unorthodox medical care.”26  
When there is no clear superior medical treatment, it is up to the discretion of 
the judge to decide.27 
                                                 
best interests of their children.” Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.  Parents make these decisions because 
minors need time to develop their own decision-making skills and parents are presumed to have the 
best interest of the child in mind when making such decisions on the child’s behalf.  Id. 
 19. Sher, supra note 13, at 157. 
 20. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 657–58 (1972) (holding that the state cannot 
presume that unmarried fathers are unfit). 
 21. Cohan, supra note 4, at 860–61.  “[L]ife sustaining medical treatment” are protocols that 
prolong life, but do not save life.  Id. at 853.  Common examples of life-sustaining medical 
treatment includes ventilators and breathing tubes for mechanical respiration and tubes that provide 
artificial hydration and nutrition.  Id. 
 22. Id. at 860–61. 
 23. Id. at 861.  “[T]he state will invariably succeed in overriding the right of parents to act as 
surrogate decision makers, even if this means violating the parents’ deeply held religious beliefs 
that prohibit the treatment in question.”  Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67, 170 (1944) (holding that the state has an 
interest in protecting a child from street preaching on a highway, and that equal protection is not 
violated in this case because public highways cannot be considered church property). 
 26. Sher, supra note 13,  at 190.  This presents a challenge for the courts to decide between 
multiple medical experts giving conflicting testimony.  Id. 
 27. Id. at 193. 
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B. Mature Minor Doctrine 
Ordering medical treatment for minors is further complicated when the child 
is older and capable of thinking deeply about his situation and develops his own 
treatment preferences.  The mature minor doctrine states that “some minors have 
sufficient maturity to understand and appreciate the benefits and risks of 
proposed medical treatment of all kinds, and thus mature minors should have the 
right to give or decline to give informed consent regarding all health care 
decisions.”28  The Supreme Court of Tennessee recognizes the mature minor 
doctrine and reaches a decision in such cases by considering 
[w]hether a minor has the capacity to consent to medical treatment 
depends upon the age, ability, experience, education, training, and 
degree of maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, as well as upon 
the conduct and demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident 
involved.  Moreover, the totality of the circumstances, the nature of 
the treatment and its risks or probable consequences, and the minor’s 
ability to appreciate the risks and consequences are to be considered.29 
Additionally, states have passed statutes that allow unemancipated minors to 
make medical decisions for themselves, so long as certain criteria is met.30 
In re E.G., the Supreme Court of Illinois heard an appeal of the trial court’s 
order that found E.G. was a neglected minor because she and her mother refused 
blood transfusions.31  E.G. was seventeen when she was diagnosed with 
Leukemia and doctors informed her that a necessary part of life saving treatment 
was blood transfusions, and if she refused the blood transfusions she would 
likely die.32  At a neglect proceeding in juvenile court, a guardian was appointed 
                                                 
 28. Cohan, supra note 4, at 872. 
 29. Id. at 874; see also In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y. 
1990) (recognizing the mature minor doctrine, but finding that the minor in this case did not met 
the criteria of a “mature minor”); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989) (holding that a minor 
may make her own medical decisions if adjudged sufficiently mature); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 
S.W.2d 739, 755 (Tenn. 1987) (recognizing the mature minor doctrine). 
 30. Will, supra note 18, at 259 n.166–67 (noting that the South Carolina statute allows minors 
over the age of sixteen to consent to medical treatment, the Louisiana statute allows minors to 
consent to treatment and provides that minors may not refuse treatment a parent has consented to, 
the Arkansas statute allows minors of sufficient intelligence to consent to treatment, the Idaho 
statute allows anyone competent to make medical decisions to make such decisions even if they are 
a minor, the Alaska statute allows minors who receive counseling about the treatment to consent 
without parental approval, and the Nevada statute allows minors who understand the treatment and 
its purpose to make medical decisions as long as providers work with the minor to keep parents 
informed where possible). 
 31. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323. 
 32. Id.  “As Jehovah’s Witnesses, both E.G. and her mother desired to observe their religion’s 
prohibition against the ‘eating’ of blood.”  Id.  Her mother did consent to all treatment that did not 
require blood transfusions.  Id. 
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who consented to the blood transfusions on E.G.’s behalf.33  On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Illinois recognized “a mature minor may exercise a common 
law right to consent to or refuse medical care.”34 
C. Competent Adults 
Competent adults have the right to refuse medical treatment on multiple legal 
grounds.  The right to refuse medical treatment is recognized as a part of a 
person’s due process rights guaranteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.35  The right to refuse medical treatment also implicates the right 
to privacy, as medical choices are considered to be deeply personal and 
fundamental to the self-determination of individuals.36  The Supreme Court has 
also recognized that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, 
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless 
by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”37  However, the right to refuse 
medical treatment is not unlimited; exercise of it must be weighed against state 
interest in “the preservation of life.”38 
In applying such a balancing test, the court employs the common law doctrine 
of necessity, which “holds that certain conduct, though it violates certain rights, 
is justified because it averts a greater evil and hence produces a net social gain 
or benefit to society.”39  Additionally, the balancing test considers the state 
interest in preventing harm to its citizens.40  States and private individuals are 
allowed to act when a person poses a danger to themselves or others.  For 
                                                 
 33. Id. at 323–24. 
 34. Id. at 328.  But cf. In re Thomas B., 574 N.Y.S.2d 659, 659–60 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991) 
(holding that a fifteen-year-old has no right to refuse medical treatment as the mature minor doctrine 
is not recognized, and therefore he should undergo the biopsy procedure because a legal guardian 
determined that it was in his best interest); O.G. v. Baum, 790 S.W.2d 839, 842 (Tex. App. 1990) 
(holding that Texas has not adopted the mature minor doctrine, and therefore the minor could not 
refuse a blood transfusion necessary to save his life after he was struck by a train and required arm 
surgery). 
 35. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (holding that a state may 
require clear and convincing evidence for a guardian to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from an 
incompetent adult). 
 36. Cohan, supra note 4, at 857. 
 37. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
 38. Superintendent of Belchertown St. School v. Saikeicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1997) 
(recognizing that the state claims a state interest in the preservation of life, and stemming from that 
“the protection of the interests of innocent third parties; . . . the prevention of suicide; and . . . 
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.”). 
 39. Cohan, supra note 4, at 858 (noting that this principle is rooted in the utilitarian idea of 
the “ends-justifying-the-means,” where the totality of public policy considerations justifies the 
violation of individual rights). 
 40. See id. at 859 (discussing how authorities can use force to prevent individuals from 
harming themselves or others). 
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example, in the incident of a drug overdose,41 medical professionals are 
permitted to aid the individual, even if the overdose was casued by a suicide 
attempt and the individual is incapable of consenting to treatment.42 
1. State Interest 
The Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy in Roe v. Wade, stating 
that even though, “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of 
privacy . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a 
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
Constitution.”43  The Supreme Court has also recognized that the state has an 
interest in protecting citizens from potential abuse, upholding the integrity of the 
judicial proceeding, and above all, the preservation of human life.44  Some state 
courts have also found a state interest in protecting children from abandonment 
by forcing their parent to undergo treatment.45 
D. Pregnant Women 
While competent adult’s right to refuse medical treatment is well recognized,  
case law is inconsistent on whether the right is extended to pregnant women.46  
Courts in Illinois and New York have grappled significantly with this issue.47  In 
Illinois, the rights of pregnant women are superior to the rights of the fetus, so 
“women have an absolute right to refuse medical treatment.”48  However, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that the state has an “important and legitimate 
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.”49  There is case law that 
                                                 
 41. Id. at 859–60 (explaining the court is more reluctant to interfere with the patient’s wishes 
as the required intervention becomes more invasive). 
 42. Id. at 859. 
 43. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–55 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy is derived 
from the substantive due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment and that right to privacy 
encompasses abortion subject to limitations justified by a compelling state interest); see, e.g., 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (holding that the state interest in obtaining evidence for 
a criminal trial did not outweigh the patient’s privacy interest in refusing treatment, and the 
defendant shot during a robbery could not be forced to undergo surgery to remove a bullet that the 
state wanted to use as evidence against him at trial). 
 44. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281–82 (1990). 
 45. Cohan, supra note 4, at 881–82. 
 46. Id. at 896. 
 47. Id. at 897. 
 48. Id. at 898.  See also Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 361 (Ill. 1988) (holding that 
there is no cause of action for prenatal negligence by a fetus against its mother); In re Baby Boy 
Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that a competent woman has the right to 
refuse medical treatment even if it poses risks to her viable, unborn child). 
 49. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). 
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holds that the mother’s right to choose her own medical treatment can be 
outweighed by the rights of the fetus.50 
Further, courts have yet to consider the parental rights of the father when 
compelling pregnant women to undergo medical treatment.51  The rights of the 
father have not been recognized in the abortion context, but they have been 
recognized in the adoption context.52  Cases involving court-ordered medical 
treatment can be distinguished from abortion cases because the result of the 
former imposes a duty on the father to provide for the child that is not present in 
abortion cases.53  Courts must balance the rights of the father with the intrusion 
on the mother, but thus far, courts have not addressed this issue.54 
E. Incompetent Adults 
Competent adults have the right to refuse medical treatment as a part of their 
right to privacy, right to self-determination, and right to substantive due 
process.55  An issue arises when competent adults are no longer competent and 
able to exercise these rights.  Courts have wrestled with the extent that the rights 
of incompetent adults can be effectuated by a guardian. 
In re Quinlan was a case before the New Jersey Supreme Court regarding 
Karen Quinlan, who was in a “chronic persistent vegetative state[,]” but did not 
meet any of the criteria for brain death.56  Karen’s father asked the court to 
declare her incompetent and then appoint him as guardian, which would allow 
                                                 
 50. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459–60 (Ga. 1981) 
(granting temporary custody of the unborn child to the state, so state officials could consent to 
medical treatment on the child’s behalf against the mother’s wishes); see also Raleigh Fitkin-Paul 
Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964) (holding that “the unborn child 
is entitled to the law’s protection.”) The Court based its reasoning in part on New Jersey case law 
that allowed children to sue their parents for injuries that occurred before birth as a result of 
negligence.  Id.  The reasoning is in part based on the recognition of the courts that the unborn are 
entitled to certain rights.  Id. 
 51. David C. Blickenstaff, Defining the Boundaries of Personal Privacy: Is There a Paternal 
Interest in Compelling Therapeutic Fetal Surgery?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1157, 1161 (1994). 
 52. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 893–96 (1992) (holding that spousal 
notification imposes an undue burden on a married woman’s ability to get an abortion); 
Blickenstaff, supra note 51, at 1181.  Courts have held that in some cases the father can even 
prevent the mother from giving the child up for adoption.  Id. at 1181–82. 
 53. Id. at 1197–98. 
 54. Id. at 1158.  “The outcome of the balancing test depends on the severity of the 
contemplated intrusion and the nature of the asserted interest; if the intrusion is minor and the 
benefit great, the state may prevail . . . .  The father would assert his interest through the state . . . 
.”  Id. at 1161. 
 55. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663–64 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub 
nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (discussing how the right to privacy exists under 
the Constitution and encompasses the right to decline medical treatment). 
 56. Id. at 654. 
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him to remove life-sustaining treatment.57  The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
appointed Joseph Quinlan as guardian of Karen and was specific in their opinion 
that 
should the responsible attending physicians conclude that there is no 
reasonable possibility of Karen’s ever emerging from her present 
comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state and that the life-
support apparatus now being administered to Karen should be 
discontinued, they shall consult with the hospital “Ethics Committee” 
or like body of the institution in which Karen is then hospitalized.  If 
that consultative body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of 
Karen’s ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a 
cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may be 
withdrawn and said action shall be without any civil or criminal 
liability.58 
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Nancy Cruzan was 
deemed incompetent after she suffered severe injuries in a car accident.59  Her 
parents, as guardians, sought to withdraw her artificial nutrition when it was 
determined that Nancy would not recover cognitive function.60  Here, the 
Supreme Court held that while guardians may refuse medical treatment on the 
part of an incompetent adult, a state is within its right to impose an evidentiary 
standard that guardians must satisfy in order to refuse medical treatment on 
behalf of the incompetent patient.61 
1. Standards Employed by the Courts 
Courts attempt to determine the choice that the incompetent patient would 
make if he were able using the “substituted judgement” approach.62  Under this 
method, the court hears evidence that sheds light on what the patient would 
likely desire, and then makes a subjective determination based on the facts 
before it.63  Evidence to be heard includes living wills, statements from family 
or friends, and anything else that could indicate what the incompetent person’s 
                                                 
 57. Id. at 651. 
 58. Id. at 671–72. 
 59. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990). 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 286–87.  The Cruzan’s could withdraw Nancy’s artificial hydration and nutrition if 
they could prove by clear and convincing evidence that this is what she would have wanted.  Id. 
 62. Death by Right: A Call for Change to Michigan’s Health Care Decisions Law, 72 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 927, 932 (1995). 
 63. Id. 
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intent would be.64  In most states, the burden of proof is clear and convincing 
evidence, however some states require a lower standard.65 
An alternative approach used by the courts has been the “best interests 
approach,” which uses an objective standard to determine whether or not the 
medical treatment serves the best interest of the incompetent person.66  The court 
looks at three factors when making its determination: “1) [r]elief from pain and 
suffering; 2) the preservation and the potential restoration of the patient’s ability 
to function normally; and 3) the quality and extent of the patient’s life if life-
support is or is not removed.”67  A signficant issue with this approach is that it 
assumes there a single objectively correct approach, while in actuality, doctors 
frequently disagree on treatment and there may be multiple treatment options 
which produce the same effect.68 
II. CURRENT METHODS OF RESOLUTION 
A. Court Orders 
In issuing orders requiring or preventing patients from receving certain 
medical treatments, Courts begin by balancing the patient’s rights to autonomy 
with state’s interest.  The state interests considered are “(1) preservation of life, 
(2) prevention of suicide, (3) protection of third party interests, and (4) 
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession.”69  How courts 
balance these interests varies by state, so the same case may have many different 
outcomes based only on geography.70  This shows the lack of a uniform standard 
                                                 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  “For example, in the case of Superintendent of Belchertown Schools v. Saikewicz, 
the court employed a ‘reasonable person substituted judgement’ standard . . . .”  Id.  The best 
interests approach or a combination of standards have also been used by courts. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  Some states combine the substituted judgement and best interests approaches by first 
looking for clear and convincing evidence of intent, but if the clear and convincing burden cannot 
be met the courts can employ a “‘limited best interests test,’ which permits the court to withdraw 
treatment if the sustaining of the patient’s life is outweighed by the patient’s pain and suffering.  
Otherwise, if there is no evidence of the patient’s wishes, the court will employ a purely objective, 
best interests standard.”  Id. at 932–33; see, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229, 1232, 1236, 
1241–43 (N.J. 1985) (describing this process, focusing on what evidence courts should look to and 
weigh when deciding what the patient would have wanted, and concluding there was insufficient 
evidence to demonstrate the patient would have refused the treatment under the subjective test). 
 68. See Ardath A. Hamann, Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement to Living Wills 
and Durable Powers of Attorney, 38 VILL. L. REV. 103, 118 (1993). 
 69. Cohan, supra note 4, at 851. 
 70. See David M. Shelton, Keeping End-of-Life Decisions Away From Courts After Thirty 
Years of Failure: Bioethical Mediation as an Alternative for Resolving End-of-Life Disputes, 31 
HAMLINE L. REV. 103, 110 (2008) (noting that some scholars believe that the difference in 
outcomes reflects courts inserting their own personal and political views into end of life decision-
making cases). 
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for medical disputes, and the need to define more clearly the patient rights and 
state interests.71 
Allowing courts to resolve these issues is supported by arguments that  “courts 
can conduct a ‘detached and passionate investigation’ in order to determine 
whether to continue or terminate treatment.”72  However, many people correctly 
argue that courts are the inappropriate party to decide these cases.  The objective 
approach offered by courts fails to consider deeply-rooted personal feelings of 
the patient and his loved ones that should be accounted for when determining 
the best interests of the patient.73  In these highly emotionally charged situations, 
judges lack the intimacy with the patient that the disputing parties often have.  
These deciscions should be resolved by the people closest to the patient.  Further, 
escalating the dispute to lititgation adds increased tension to an already sensitive 
situation.74  The adversarial nature of our court system will result in damaged 
relationships amongst the parties.  Trust  between the patient’s family and the 
patient’s care-giver is vital in creating an optimal atmosphere for these delicate 
circumstances.75   
The burden placed on patient’s familiesfamily’s to prove the patient’s wishes 
is also a frequently criticized consequence of resolving these disputes with 
litigation.76  Courts hold that “the burden [is] on the patient, guardian, or family 
to prove that termination or continuation of life-sustaining treatment truly 
reflects the patient’s interests.  However, physicians, health care institutions, or 
hospital ethics committees may make decisions to continue or terminate life-
sustaining treatment without much potential for repercussion.”77  However, this 
burden is likely not difficult to meet in most situations, as patients and their 
guardians are most likely to be aware of the patient’s wishes.78  This burden 
serves as a safeguard to situations in which the patient’s family or guardians 
advocate for a deciscion contrary to the true desires of the patient.  In that case, 
the courts would play a vital role in protecting the rights of a patient who could 
not advocate on their own.  Further, it makes sense that hospitals and doctors do 
not carry this burden, because while the patient has a right to refuse treatment, 
the hospital and doctors are not obligated to provide a certain kind of treatment.79   
Courts are not the ideal decision makers in these disputes.  But, they 
undoubtedly must be a part of these disputes.  It is the job of the court systems 
to protect the rights of individuals.  Sometime that protection is in the form of 
                                                 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 110–11. 
 74. Id. at 111. 
 75. Gatter, supra note 12, at 1095. 
 76. Shelton, supra note 70, at 112. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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upholding patient wishes when the doctors feel differently, but in other situations 
the courts might need to protect the patient from their own family acting contrary 
to the patient’s best interests. 
B. Surrogate Decision Makers 
Most states have statutes that allow a surrogate to make medical decisions 
when someone is incapacitated without an advanced directive.80  The statutes 
often establish a priority list of family members authorized make medical 
decisions for the incapacitated person, starting with spouses, immediate family, 
and then extended family.81  If family members are not available, some statutes 
allow another adult “who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, 
who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, [and] who is reasonably 
available” to serve as a surrogate.82  Finally, if no such unrelated adult is 
available, the doctors are permitted to make health care decisions based off what 
a majority of people would elect.83 
1. Benefits of Surrogate Decision Makers 
The benefits of designating a surrogate to make health care decisions are that 
it is an efficient decision-making process, it yields a clear answer so parties know 
exactly who has authority, and it keeps family matters out of the courts.84  Most 
Americans seem to agree that immediate family members are the group of 
people that should make decisions on behalf of an incapacitated person.85  While 
surrogate decision-making with priority lists may be effective, the ultimate 
question should be whether the decisions made by surrogates are consistent with 
what the incompetent patient would have wanted. 
Priority lists are criticized for accommodating the unique structure or 
dynamics that some families have.86  This is a fair criticism, but it does not 
                                                 
 80. Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Designating Health Care Decisionmakers For 
Patients Without Advanced Directives: A Psychological Critiques, 42 GA. L. REV. 979, 984 (2008). 
 81. Id. at 984–85.  Some states allow for domestic partners or close friends to be surrogates, 
some states involve the incapacitated patient’s doctors in the selection process of the decision 
maker, and some states allow the interested parties to select the surrogate amongst themselves.  Id. 
at 985.  The Uniform Healthcare Decision Act also establishes a priority list that is similar to most 
states and provides that if a surrogate is not available, a health care provider may obtain consent 
from “any member of the following classes of the patient’s family who is reasonably available, in 
descending order of priority, may act as surrogate: (1) the spouse, unless legally separated; (2) an 
adult child; (3) a parent; or (4) an adult brother or sister.”  UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 
5(b) (1993). 
 82. Kohn & Blumenthal, supra note 81, at 985 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-111-
1806(c)(2) (West 2006)). 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. at 987–88. 
 85. Id. at 989–90. 
 86. See id. at 990–91. 
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diminish the need for decision-making statutes.   It is not possible to create a 
statute that encompasses all unique family strucutres and dynamics.  The 
decision-making statutes are intended to serve as default rules.  They are a 
starting point, and any competent adult is free to designate a different choice 
than what the statute may require.  Additionally, considering how few adults 
contemplate such decisions ahead of time, there is a great need for default rule.87 
Decision-making statutes could be improved by accounting for other factors 
that often influence decision-making.  For example, age may play a significant 
role in one’s decision on who should be a surrogate, but age is not considered in 
the statutes.88  Culture is also not accounted for in the decision-making statutes, 
but different cultures within the United States have values and norms regarding 
care of one of their members that is not contemplated in statutes.89 
2. Criticism of Surrogate Decision-Making 
The major drawback to surrogate decision-making is when the surrogate 
makes a choice inconsistent witht the desires of the incapacitated.  This may 
occur in two likely scenarios.  First, studies show that surrogates have a hard 
time making decisions for incompetent adults when their wishes are unknown.90  
Surrogates “often do not know the wishes of the person on whose behalf they 
are making decisions, even if they think that they do.”91  The second scenario, is 
when surrogates outright refuse to effectuate the wishes of the incompetent 
patient.92  One study found that one-third of surrogate decision makers would 
consent on behalf of the principal to a medical study when they knew that is not 
what the principal would have wanted.93 
Surrogate decision makers and the statutes that authorize them provide an 
efficient and clear solution when doctors require consent for an incompetent 
adult.94  As default rules, they represent what the American public in general 
would want.95  To better accommodate individual cases, the patient should 
designate a surrogate himself.  The major drawback to surrogate decision makers 
                                                 
 87. Id. at 986–87. 
 88. Id. at 990–91 (noting also that gender is a factor that is not considered by decision-making 
statutes, but females are disproportionately chosen as surrogates over their male counterparts).  A 
person might prefer their brother make medical decisions over their elderly parent.  While another 
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 89. Id. at 992–93 (explaining that some cultures, like Korean-Americans, have a more 
“‘family-centered’ model of decision making” that is less individualistic and more communal). 
 90. Id. at 996. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 987–88. 
 95. Id. 
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is that they do not always act according to the wishes of the incompetent 
patient.96  Further, there are no safeguards that can require the surrogate to act 
according to the principal’s intent, if the surrogate even knows what the 
principal’s intent is at all.97  Surrogate decision-making is an important first step 
in medical decision-making, but it is not enough to keep disputes out of court.98 
C. Advanced Directives 
Advanced directives serve as an instrument for patients to record their wishes 
for end-of-life deciscions in the event that they ever become incapacitated.99  
Implementation of advanced directives guarantees that the patient preserves his 
right to self-determination, even when incapacitated.100  However, the major 
failure of advanced directives is how rarely they are created.101 
Advanced directives, when properly utilized, allow a patient to maintain their 
autonomy in health care decisions.  A competent patient is capable of 
contemplating what medical treatment that is in his best interest.102  Advanced 
directives allow a competent adult to ensure any end-of-life deciscions made 
when he is incapacitated will respect his wishes, such as his religious beliefs.103  
Furhter, advanced directives shield medical providers from liability when actting 
according to the patient’s advanced directive.104 
There are drawbacks to advanced directives.  Many adults never create an 
advanced directive, which limits their benefit and utility as a solution for 
improving end-of-life decision-making as a whole.105  It is also difficult for 
                                                 
 96. Id. at 981. 
 97. See id. at 996–97.  Research shows that surrogate decision makers frequently do not know 
what the incapacitated person would want, even if they believe that they do.  Id.  This makes 
medical decision-making very difficult for surrogates, even if they are trying their best to effectuate 
the incapacitated person’s wishes.  One study found that a spouse’s ability to predict the other 
spouse’s preference on CPR treatment varied from forty to ninety percent.  Id. 
 98. In some cases, there are multiple surrogate decision makers, and they can disagree over 
treatment which may lead to a court dispute.  Additionally, disagreements with medical staff or 
over a specific treatment can bring a dispute to court.  Id. at 1010. 
 99. Shelton, supra note 70, at 127. 
 100. Id. at 128. 
 101. Id. at 129. 
 102. Id. at 128. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 129. 
 105. Id.  It has been found that   
less than 25 percent of individuals enact advanced directives or living wills.  Perhaps this 
shockingly low rate of enactment is a testament to individuals feeling that their families 
and physicians will make the right decisions for them when that time arrives.  Supporters 
of advanced directives and living wills cannot explain this phenomenon by arguing a lack 
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the formation of living wills following the Terri Schiavo dispute. 
Id. at 129–30. 
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advanced directives to provide sufficiently detailed instructions that can be 
implemented by medical professionals even in the most unpredictable of 
situations.106  Additionally, the frequent improvement of medical technology 
requires that advanced directives, to be easily administered, are routinely 
updated to account for the current state of technology.107 
Advanced directives are a strong solution for competent adults who take  the 
time to fully contemplate what their choices would be, should they become 
incapacitated.  Advanced directives remain effective as long as there is a periodic 
review of the document to account for improvements in medical technology and 
the person’s current wishes.108  However, despite being a well-know resource, 
many people never create an advanced directive.109  Most people do not take the 
time to write down such decisions and discuss them with their caregivers or 
family members.110  And, often times, it is deficiencies and vagueness within the 
advanced directive that leads to a challenge in court.111  Therefore, advanced 
directives are not a pratical solution to keeping medical disputes out of court.   
D. Futility Statutes 
Most states have enacted futility statutes, which allow doctors to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment in certain situations.112  Futility statutes are 
intended to resolve situations in which the patient or his surrogate seek to 
continue treatment, while doctors recovery of the patient is impossible.113  It is 
often the decision of a surrogate to withdraw life support, and when faced with 
such a devastating decision, some surrogates refuse to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment.114  Futility statutes permit doctors to unilaterally decide to withdraw 
care and shield them from liability.115   
The proponent’s arguments for the advancement of futility statutes is that they 
further “the goals and values of medicine.”116  Futility statutes are argued to 
protect a level of professional integrity so that doctors are not forced to provide 
                                                 
 106. Id. at 130–31. 
 107. Id. at 130–32. 
 108. See id. at 131–32. 
 109. Id. at 129. 
 110. See id. at 129–30. 
 111. See id. at 130. 
 112. Pope, supra note 11, at 3–4. 
 113. Id. at 9–10. 
 114. Id. at 10–12.  Some surrogates feel guilty for withdrawing treatment, and are unable to 
deal with that grief.  Id.  Some surrogates believe that new medical technology will became 
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 115. Id. at 4. 
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540 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 68:525 
treatment that will fail to patients.117  Doctors want to foster an environment 
where resources are used prudently, patients’ integrity is respected, and families 
have an accurate expectation for the future.118  This is why “standards of 
professional practice . . . [do not] include measures aimed solely at maintaining 
corporeal existence and biologic functioning.  Under these circumstances 
providers feel that continued LSMT is . . . being used for the wrong ends.  
Moreover, health care providers find it gruesome, distressing, and demoralizing 
to provide treatment that harms patients.”119  Doctors’ recommendations are the 
product of strong and deliberate thought.  Doctors often accommodate the 
surrogate’s wishes initially “as a matter of sensitivity to religious, cultural, or 
moral values.”120  However, if there is continued disagreement over treatment 
methods and goals, resolution of the futility dispute will depend on hospital 
intervention or their legal channels. 
E. Alternative Dispute Resolution Currently in Place 
1. Futility Dispute Resolution 
Hospitals have a process in place that works to settle disputes between doctors 
and patients or their deciscion makers.  The first step in resolving these disputes 
is communication between the patient, the patient’s caregivers or surrogates, and 
the medical staff.121  The second step is to bring in a mediator to help the parties 
come to a consensus as to a care plan.122  The next step is to go to the hospital 
ethics committee if a resolution cannot be reached with a mediator.123  If the 
provider and surrogate are still unable to make a decision on patient care, then 
the provider may attempt to change the decision maker.124  The provider can see 
if there is another person authorized legally to make a decision and evaluate if 
that person would be willing to withdraw life-sustaining measures at the 
objection of the first decision maker.125  Alternatively, some medical providers 
have attempted to argue that the decision maker is abusing the patient by 
requiring him to submit to unnecessary medical treatment, and upon a finding of 
neglect, a new surrogate would be required to be appointed.126  If the provider is 
                                                 
 117. See id. at 15–16. 
 118. Id. at 17–18. 
 119. Id. at 15–16. 
 120. Id. at 20. 
 121. Id. at 22. 
 122. Id. 
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 124. Id. at 23–24. 
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unable to change the decision maker, “then the health care provider should do 
one of the following: (1) find a new provider or (2) attempt to transfer the patient 
to another institution willing to comply with the surrogate’s treatment requests.  
While this is rarely successful, it does sometimes resolve a few additional 
disputes.”127  The final step is for the hospital to unilaterally withdraw care.128 
This process handling futility disputes within hospitals has considerable room 
for improvement.  Doctors and scholars tend to disagree over what information, 
how much information, and when to provide the information to the decision 
makers.129  Patients facing a dispute over medical treatment are at a disadvantage 
because they lack the medical knowledge of the doctors, they are in a strange 
and unfamiliar setting, and they are facing significant amounts of physical and 
emotional stress.130 
2. Hospital Ethics Committees 
In addition to a dispute resolution process, “[c]ourts and health care 
institutions have granted hospital ethics committees varying degrees of power, 
all of which allow the hospital ethics committee to maintain great control over 
patient decisions.”131  Hospital ethics committees have become increasingly 
popular since the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed their use in In re 
Quinlan.132  The powers enjoyed by ethics committees include veto power over 
patient treatment, power over the appointment of a guardian, and power over 
whether or not to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.133  Hospital ethics 
committees are composed of hospital employees, mostly nurses and doctors, and 
occasionally one member of the community.134  Training and expertise of 
individuals varies by individual and by committee.135  Some ethics committees 
have moved to a mediation model rather than a decision-making model.136  
                                                 
 127. Id. at 25. 
 128. Id.  For instance,  
[o]ne recent five-year study of sixteen hospitals found that in approximately sixty-five 
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 129. See id. at 22 n.90. 
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However, ethics committees still have not been able to effectively reach 
resolutions, and usually the hospital ethics committees acquiesce to the decision 
makers wishes.137 
The major criticism of hospital ethics committees is that they put their own 
professional and institutional interests above those of their patients.138  The 
committees are made up of medical professionals who naturally have an interest 
in protecting the institution that employs them.  Even before disputes reach the 
courts, the process of the ethics committee is adversarial between the hospital 
and the patient, which causes problems for physicians still treating the patient in 
question.139 
Ethics committees make decisions on a spectrum.  Their deciscions range 
from taking unilateral action by the hospital to caving to patient’s demands.  The 
extent to which a hospital exercises power will depend on its own interest.140 
3. Bioethical Mediation 
Some hospitals employ mediators to assist in disputes when patients, their 
families, and doctors cannot reach a treatment decision.141  In such cases a 
mediator steps in between doctors and patient decision makers to increase 
communication, and hopefully come to a consensus on a care plan for the 
patient.142  Opinions on mediation in medical disputes is mixed.  Those that 
advocate for mediation believe that it is a “forum for fully understanding the 
interests of the parties involved, as well as a forum for dealing with bioethical 
concerns.”143  Some argue that mediation impedes on a patient’s right to 
autonomy because it creates a procedural barrier that patients or their decision 
makers must work through before treatment can be administered or 
withdrawn.144  The strongest argument against mediation in medical disputes is 
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 142. Pope, supra note 11, at 22–23 
 143. Shelton, supra note 70, at 132. 
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that the typical goals of mediation do not fit the typical medical dispute 
situation.145 
The typical goal of mediation is to reach some sort of compromise between 
the two parties where each party walks away with something bargained for.146  
That is not possible in most of these cases.147  No compromise can be reached 
when only one of two scenarios can prevail: ending or continuing life-sustaining 
treatment.148  Typical mediation in these cases have failed because it does not 
accommodate the unique nature of medical disputes. 
First, the needs of the decision maker and the family of the patient need to be 
acknowledged and addressed in the decision-making process.  Family members 
are often the surrogates in these cases and they may, at times, have different 
religious or moral views than the patient.149  Family members also have to deal 
with the aftermath of the treatment decision in ways that the patient does not 
have to consider.  If the choice results in the death of the patient, then grief may 
be may be a factor considered by the patient’s family or deciscion maker, but 
not the patient.150  The family is also responsible for providing for the patient.  
The patient’s family unfortunately must consider finances when looking at 
treatment options, even when the patient might not consider such interests or 
even be able to.151  The family and decision makers surrounding the patient need 
to be considered in the mediation process. 
Another problem with mediating medical disputes is that the mediator is often 
employed by the hospital.  A common problem in medical disputes that doctors 
seek to avoid is that the patient and their family will distrust the doctors on their 
case.152  Part of this distrust stems from the dispute being the doctor against the 
patient.  A mediator employed by the hospital will not remedy the situation, it 
will make it worse.  Now it is the doctor and another employee against the 
patient.  For mediation to work, the conflict of interest must be removed. 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF MEDIATION 
Mediation can be effective in resolving medical disputes because it allows the 
two parties to gain an understanding of the interests of each person involved.  
Mediation also gives an opportunity to the patient’s decision makers to gain a 
better understanding of the medical issues and a realistic idea of how they can 
be solved.153  Critics of mediation characterize the dispute as a simple “yes or 
no” question, but the decision being made is influenced by the interests of each 
individual involved and though the treatment might be simple, the consequences 
are far reaching and far more complicated.154  Mediation provides a forum to 
discuss the medical decision and address the moral and ethical concerns that 
underlie such decisions.155 
Mediation must be “a fair process and seek to protect parties choosing to use 
ADR.”156  The mediator must be a neutral third-party with the requisite training 
to handle medical disputes.157  Finally, litigation must be an option because some 
parties will not reach a solution. 
One area of law where there has been increased use of mediation is in divorce 
proceedings.158  Therefore, there is more research about the effectiveness of 
mediation in the divorce context.  The successes and failure of mediation in the 
divorce context can be used in formulating a mediation process in the medical 
treatment context.  Mediation in the divorce process allows parties to air 
concerns, provides a neutral third-party, and is less adversarial than traditional 
litigation.159 
The ability to air concerns in mediation aligns well with the medical treatment 
construct.  The mediator can give the parties an opportunity to voice their 
concerns.  Doing this through caucusing allows parties to vent their feelings and 
be exposed to opposite view points in an environment where they feel 
comfortable.160  The mediator can facilitate this discussion and help parties 
understand the information they are lacking. 
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A neutral third-party is another characteristic of divorce mediation that 
translates well to medical treatment mediation.  Mediation must protect the 
parties involved to be effective.  The patient, first and foremost, needs to be 
protected from being coerced into making medical decisions against their 
interests.161  It is important for the mediator to “equalize power imbalances 
between the parties.”162  This can be done by ensuring the patient and the family 
understands the medical terminology used by the physicians.163 
The mediator must be a neutral third-party to avoid conflicts of interest.164  
When there is a medical dispute and the patient or their family distrust their 
doctor, having a mediator employed by the hospital is not helpful.  The mediator 
is simply an extension of the doctor and the hospital at that point, and this further 
adds to the trust issues of the patient.  The goal is for a neutral third-party to 
bring the two sides together so each party can better understand the other’s 
interests.165  Mediators should not be employed by the hospitals because it is 
unlikely the mediator would remain neutral and not consider the interests of his 
employer.  Even if the mediator could remain neutral, the appearance to the 
patient and their family would not be one of neutrality. 
Some argue that a mediator employed by the hospital, though not neutral, is 
still beneficial because the mediator might better understand the hierarchy of the 
hospital and the different challenges the hospital presents.166  However this 
argument underestimates the strain a patient or their deciscion maker’s distrust  
of the hospital, including its employees, might detrimentally effect the mediation 
process.167  If the patient and family are not trustful of the mediator, then the 
entire process will likely be ineffective, because “in reality too many conflicts 
may arise from the mediator’s affiliation with one of the potentially interested 
parties.”168  Therefore, the most practical alternative is to have the mediation run 
through the courts.  The mediators do not necessarily need to be employed by 
the courts, but the courts need to be responsible for oversight. 
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It should be noted that everyone has biases that are brought into mediation 
and litigation.169  Ideally these feelings will not impact decision-making, but no 
problem-solving mechanisms will be perfect.  Mediation offers an opportunity 
for the mediator to disclose biases at the beginning so parties are aware at the 
outset how the mediator’s judgement might be affected.170 
One concern that arises when considering power imbalances, even with 
neutral third-party decision makers, is the frequency players are involved in the 
process.  The patient and the surrogate decision maker are likely to be involved 
only once, while the hospital is likely to be involved multiple times.  It is 
important to note that such power imbalances happen whether the parties appear 
before a judge or a mediator.  Mediation offers more flexibility in its process, so 
mediators are able to employ a variety of techniques aimed at correcting power 
imbalances.171 
A neutral mediator is an important feature and vital to the success of 
mediation.  However, the neutral position of the mediator must be paired with 
additional training to properly manage disputes.  Mediators in these cases also 
need additional training.  The first question to address is what profession these 
mediators will come from.  Then, the additional training to be a mediator, and 
further to be a mediator in the medical treatment context, must be considered.  
Beyond standard mediation training, mediators of medical disputes need 
bioethical training.172 
It is of the upmost importance that the mediators understand the medicine 
within these disputes, so they can properly manage the mediation process.173  
There is some debate about whether mediators must be attorneys.174  Some argue 
that mediators must be limited to attorneys because it is a natural extension of 
the legal profession, legal skills are required for mediation, and lawyers as 
mediators will give the mediation process a sense of legitimacy.175  The 
argument against limiting mediators to attorneys is, in part, that it restricts the 
                                                 
 169. Beck & Sales, supra note 159, at 1001, 1004 
 170. See id. at 1004–05. 
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pool of mediators, which limits access to mediators.176  Additionally, no studies 
indicate that having a lawyer as a mediator will lead to a better outcome.177 
In the context of medical disputes, having mediators from other backgrounds 
can be a benefit.  The likely pool of mediators would be lawyers, doctors, nurses, 
and social workers.  All of these professions require advanced education, making 
it more likely the entire mediation process is viewed with confidence and 
legitimacy.  While legal skills may be required for mediation, medical 
knowledge would also be required for this type of mediation.  No matter the 
original profession of the mediator, it is likely that they would need additional 
training.  Doctors can certainly learn how to mediate, and lawyers can learn the 
medicine behind a certain dispute.178  Though mediation is a natural extension 
of the legal profession, medical decision-making is not.  Medical understanding 
and mediation skills are both critical qualities of an effective mediator in this 
context.  Possession of a law degree or a medical degree will not indicate an 
automatic aptitude for mediation.  The pool of potential mediators should remain 
open to non-lawyers and those with the requisite training should be able to serve 
as mediators. 
Training is essential to a successful mediation program.179  The amount of 
training for mediators is another large source of debate.180  Some believe that 
training should amount to graduate level coursework in a variety of applicable 
fields, while others believe training should be short to allow volunteers to serve 
as mediators.181 
In the medical dispute context, it is unrealistic to ask an attorney or doctor to 
obtain an additional graduate degree for a position that is may not  be his full-
time work.  This is balanced with the complex nature of medical disputes that 
implicate legal, bioethical, religious, and financial concerns.182  A certificate 
program with smaller courses covering these areas would produce well-trained 
mediators.  Additionally, mediators should call on their own experiences in their 
service as mediators.183 
As mentioned previously, courts provide a neutral forum to resolve disputes 
and as such should oversee mediation.  Extending from this, the legal system 
should oversee quality control of mediators.  Bar associations oversee quality of 
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 178. Acting as a mediator is not for everyone.  Some attorneys, especially those familiar with 
legal disputes arising in the medical context, may be well suited to serve as mediators.  Additionally, 
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 181. Id. at 218. 
 182. See supra Part II. 
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attorneys, a smaller but similar mechanism within already existing bar 
associations could set standards and manage mediators. 
Finally, for mediation to be successfully implemented, litigation must remain 
an option.  Some disputes will not be resolved through mediation.  It is important 
that each party understands what rights they have, so they can use them if they 
feel it is necessary. 
IV. CASES WHERE ADR WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE 
In some cases, mediation will not help settle the medical dispute, and the only 
solution will be to turn to the courts.  One such case is a medical dispute where 
religious beliefs prevent a particular treatment option.184  There is no 
misunderstanding that can be resolved.  Another case arises when surrogate 
decision makers refuse to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, even with all 
available information.  For example, one study found that in approximately 2 
percent of end-of-life disputes, the hospital acted unilaterally by ending life-
sustaining treatment.185 
V. CASES BEST SUITED FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The cases best suited for mediation are those in which the disagreement is 
over the type of treatment to provide.  In these cases, the parties can often benefit 
from clarifying information.186  The mediator can ensure that the parties 
understand the science behind the medical dispute, and then use an increased 
understanding to work toward a solution.187  These cases arise when parents 
disagree with doctors over treatment of their minor child, or when the two 
parents disagree over treatment.  These cases can also arise when the caregivers 
disagree with their elderly loved one or their doctor over treatment.  An 
important part of mediation is that the parties come together and develop a care 
plan that both are comfortable with.188 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Mediation will not be effective in all cases, but that does not mean that a failed 
mediation attempt has no value.  The process of mediation will bring parties to 
better understand the others’ interests, so even if there is litigation there is better 
understanding.189  The knowledge of the other party’s interests makes litigation 
easier on an emotional level for the parties.190  That kind of understanding cannot 
be achieved through litigation alone because those interests no longer matter.191 
Mediation provides a forum for interested parties to be heard.  Litigation is 
not concerned with the individual interests of doctors, hospitals, or surrogate 
decision makers.  In litigation, the concern is only for the patient and the facts 
before the court.192  But, these cases have devastating impacts for all parties 
involved.193  Mediation can make such a painful process easier. 
Mediation will work in other cases and save the parties time and money by 
keeping the dispute out of court.194  Mediation can play a valuable role in 
medical decision-making because it helps parties to better understand the issues 
and each other.195  The neutral third-party mediator can shift the power balance 
so it is equal.196  Patients and their families often need help understanding the 
medical issues and what their treatment options are.197  Doctors need to better 
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understand the motives behind a patient’s decision.  Doctors also have personal 
interests that need to be protected, such as avoiding liability.198  The mediator 
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